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Finance

Earnings Guidance
How Should Companies Interact With the Market?
By Steven Dolvin, Ph.D., CFA

T

he Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995 afforded
firms enhanced protection from lawsuits associated with
the release of earnings forecasts and other material
information. As expected, following the passage of this Act, the
number of companies providing earnings guidance increased
dramatically. For example, in 2007 approximately two-thirds
of publicly traded firms engaged in such activity.
More recently, however, the trend has reversed. Firms
such as Pfizer, Intel, Motorola, AT&T, Coca-Cola, Google and
McDonalds have eliminated their earnings guidance. This
change has been supported by well-known investors like
Warren Buffett, as well as leading industry groups such as the
CFA Institute and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
Opponents of earnings guidance cite various reasons for
their position. Most importantly, the belief is that earnings
forecasts entice both firm managers and investors to take a
short-term view of the company, which comes at the expense
of long-term value creation. For example, with these official
targets in mind, executives might be prone to manage earnings
and possibly even forego important long-term investments or
research and development expenditures for fear of the market
response associated with a shortfall to target.
From an investor perspective, earnings targets may
indirectly reduce the extent of analysis performed, as investors
are tempted to overlook the complexities of the business and
focus on a single number. The result is an increase in volatility
for the stock as a short-term divergence from earnings
guidance is given more weight than the long-term implication
of the root cause of the deviation.

Estimate accuracy
Nonetheless, firms are often hesitant to eliminate guidance
simply for fear of backlash from the investment community –
and stock analysts in particular. Analysts are fond of guidance,
as it provides a baseline for their own forecasts, essentially
making their jobs easier. Some investors thus worry that
analyst estimates would be less accurate without the guidance,
thereby inducing greater stock price volatility as investors
respond to actual earnings reports that deviate substantially
from the imprecise analyst estimates.
So, the question remains: Should firms eliminate earnings
guidance? Unfortunately, the debate, as detailed above, typically
focuses on only the extreme positions to this question, leaving
no middle ground from which both companies and investors
could benefit. Yet, it seems that a simple yes or no decision is
not the optimal outcome. For example, published studies find
that price volatility subsides after companies eliminate
earnings guidance, suggesting that opponents of earnings
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guidance are correct.
However, these studies also note
that this result is particularly
significant during periods of relative
stability in firm/market performance
(and even more so for larger firms).
Thus, smaller firms and those
experiencing turbulent times may
promote price stability by providing
earnings guidance. Similarly, the
concern that analyst estimates would
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be inaccurate may be correct;
however, studies show that the propensity of firms to preannounce (outside of typical earnings guidance) is correlated
to the accuracy of the published estimates. Thus, eliminating
earnings guidance does not suggest abolishing all material
information or discussion of general (or even specific) earnings
drivers.

Going the longer route
There is no “one-size-fits-all” solution to this issue. But,
there is evidence that points to what the probable outcome
may look like. Although analysts like guidance, surveys suggest
most may actually prefer longer forecasts, such as one-year EPS
(earnings per share) targets. This seems to be consistent with
the feelings of leading CFOs. Further, many participants seem
to agree that a single earnings number is not necessary if a
sufficient discussion of key performance drivers is provided.
So, over time, earnings guidance may progress to a more
detailed discussion of firm performance and critical value
creation drivers, with actual earnings ranges given on a longerterm (yearly) basis.
The particular issues that need addressed are not the same
for every company; thus, each company needs to develop a
disclosure policy that is relevant for the characteristics of the
particular business and industry. In doing so, however, firms
need to make sure that internal measures are structured to
match accordingly. For example, elimination of earnings
guidance would not reduce the incentive to focus on shortterm results if executive compensation is directly tied to quarterly
earnings. So, crafting a strategy of market interaction requires
detailed thought and integration across more departments than
simply investor relations.
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